2020
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Valeeva, D; Heemskerk, E M; Takes, F W The duality of firms and directors in board interlock networks: A relational event modeling approach Journal Article In: Social Networks, vol. 62, pp. 68-79, 2020. @article{Valeeva2020,
title = {The duality of firms and directors in board interlock networks: A relational event modeling approach},
author = {D Valeeva and E M Heemskerk and F W Takes},
url = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0378873320300186?},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socnet.2020.02.009},
year = {2020},
date = {2020-03-11},
journal = {Social Networks},
volume = {62},
pages = {68-79},
abstract = {The long tradition of scholarly work on corporate interlocks has left us with competing theoretical frameworks on the causes of interlock networks. Board interlocks are studied either as means to overcome the resource dependence of corporations or as a group cohesion mechanism of business elites. This contrast is due to an empirical divide of the literature where either the firms or the individuals are considered as decision-making bodies. In systematically ignoring the agency of the other group of actors, these literatures suffer from both theoretical and empirical biases in understanding the drivers of new interlocks. In this paper, we employ a relational event modeling technique that allows us to overcome this problem. The analysis of board appointments in Denmark demonstrates how in fact both personal and corporate considerations simultaneously drive the evolution of the corporate networks. The study of the duality of actors is essential for understanding the causes and consequences of corporate networks across time and space.},
keywords = {corporate networks, elites, interlocking directorates, relational event modeling},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
The long tradition of scholarly work on corporate interlocks has left us with competing theoretical frameworks on the causes of interlock networks. Board interlocks are studied either as means to overcome the resource dependence of corporations or as a group cohesion mechanism of business elites. This contrast is due to an empirical divide of the literature where either the firms or the individuals are considered as decision-making bodies. In systematically ignoring the agency of the other group of actors, these literatures suffer from both theoretical and empirical biases in understanding the drivers of new interlocks. In this paper, we employ a relational event modeling technique that allows us to overcome this problem. The analysis of board appointments in Denmark demonstrates how in fact both personal and corporate considerations simultaneously drive the evolution of the corporate networks. The study of the duality of actors is essential for understanding the causes and consequences of corporate networks across time and space. |
2019
|
Babic, M Stabilisierung, Vertiefung und Konsolidierung der Economic Governance: Elitenstrategien in der europäischen Krise Book Chapter In: pp. 109-138, Springer VS, Wiesbaden, 2019, ISBN: 2625-8749. @inbook{Babic2019b,
title = {Stabilisierung, Vertiefung und Konsolidierung der Economic Governance: Elitenstrategien in der europäischen Krise},
author = {M Babic},
url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-25037-9_5},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-25037-9_5},
isbn = {2625-8749},
year = {2019},
date = {2019-05-15},
pages = {109-138},
publisher = {Springer VS},
address = {Wiesbaden},
series = {Neue Segel, alter Kurs? Die Eurokrise und ihre Folgen für das europäische Wirtschaftsregieren},
abstract = {Existing scholarship showed that European economic elites were crucially involved in the creation and design of both, the European integration path in general as well as a neoliberally shaped economic governance in specific. The European financial and debt crisis imperiled this integration project and its neoliberal course. What does this crisis and its induced transformations mean for the strategic outlook of the European economic elites? In order to answer this question, this article sheds light on the different crisis phases from the perspective of these actors and their strategic decision-making vis-à-vis the crisis. These strategic positions are elaborated from publications of the European Round Table of Industrialists (ERT) as the central organization forum of the European economic elite and are embedded in the overall crisis dynamics. I show how the strategic outlook of the ERT changes in different crisis phases from a stabilization of the economic governance (2007-2009), its deepening (2009-2012) to its consolidation in the third phase (from 2013 onwards). I close by assessing that this consolidation of the neoliberal economic governance could remain only a temporary fix, not being able to calm the growing resistance against a further neoliberalization of the economic governance from both sides of the political spectrum and hence result in a break-up of the integration project itself in the medium run.},
keywords = {capitalism, class, elites, ERT, europe, interlocks},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {inbook}
}
Existing scholarship showed that European economic elites were crucially involved in the creation and design of both, the European integration path in general as well as a neoliberally shaped economic governance in specific. The European financial and debt crisis imperiled this integration project and its neoliberal course. What does this crisis and its induced transformations mean for the strategic outlook of the European economic elites? In order to answer this question, this article sheds light on the different crisis phases from the perspective of these actors and their strategic decision-making vis-à-vis the crisis. These strategic positions are elaborated from publications of the European Round Table of Industrialists (ERT) as the central organization forum of the European economic elite and are embedded in the overall crisis dynamics. I show how the strategic outlook of the ERT changes in different crisis phases from a stabilization of the economic governance (2007-2009), its deepening (2009-2012) to its consolidation in the third phase (from 2013 onwards). I close by assessing that this consolidation of the neoliberal economic governance could remain only a temporary fix, not being able to calm the growing resistance against a further neoliberalization of the economic governance from both sides of the political spectrum and hence result in a break-up of the integration project itself in the medium run. |