The promise and perils of using big data in the study of corporate networks: problems, diagnostics and fixes

A new paper by the CORPNET group has been published in the Global Networks journal. The article, “The promise and perils of using big data in the study of corporate networks: problems, diagnostics and fixes”, is written by Eelke Heemskerk, Kevin Young, Frank takes, Bruce Cronin, Javier Garcia-Bernardo, Lasse Hendriksen, William Winekoff, Vladimir Popov and Audrey Lautin-Lamothe, and can be found here.

Network data on connections between corporate actors and entities – for instance through co-ownership ties or elite social networks – are increasingly available to researchers interested in probing the many important questions related to the study of modern capitalism. Given the analytical challenges associated with the nature of the subject matter, variable data quality and other problems associated with currently available data on this scale, we discuss the promise and perils of using big corporate network data (BCND). We propose a standard procedure for helping researchers deal with BCND problems. While acknowledging that different research questions require different approaches to data quality, we offer a schematic platform that researchers can follow to make informed and intelligent decisions about BCND issues and address these through a specific work-flow procedure. For each step in this procedure, we provide a set of best practices for how to identify, resolve and minimize the BCND problems that arise.

Two Policy Briefs by the CORPNET group

Two Policy Briefs have been written by a member of the CORPNET group, Carmel Shenkar.

The ‘Regulatory Cooperation and Conflict: Regulating Systemic Risk in the Asset Management Industry’ Policy Brief can be found here.

This brief reviews the legal powers allocated to designated authorities to regulate the asset management industry in three ‘jurisdictions’. It focuses on the powers of different government bodies to designate and regulate potential systemic risk posed by systematically important financial institutions; and in particular, by nonbank non-insurer asset management companies. By explaining the different regulatory structures, this brief outlines the institutional architecture entrusted to maintain national and international financial stability.

The ‘Horizontal minority shareholdings in the EU, US, UK and Germany: Applicable Legal Framework’ Policy Brief can be found here.

The practice of cross-ownership in competing firms by institutional investors has grown significantly in recent years. Such cross ownership is said to result in anticompetitive effects in concentrated industries. One possibility to regulate this activity, thus, is antitrust regulation. This brief presents an initial review of current antitrust/competition regulatory framework in four jurisdictions: the EU, US, UK and Germany.